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ISLAM IN
CHINA
by
Yusuf Abdul Rahman
CHINA'S
ISLAMIC CONNECTION
Muslims take great pride
in citing a hadith that says "seek knowledge even it it is in China." It
points to the importance of seeking knowledge, even if it meant traveling
as far away as China.
China, which has been
close to Muslim hearts for over 1400 years, is home to millions of
Muslims.
Islam's contact with China
began during the caliphate of 'Uthman ibn Affan (Allayhi Rahma,
ra), the third caliph. After triumphing over the Byzantine, Romans and the
Persians, 'Uthman ibn Affan, dispatched a deputation to China in 29 AH (650
C.E., Eighteen years after the Prophet's death), under the leadership
by Sa'ad ibn Abi Waqqaas (Allayhi Rahma), Prophet Muhammad's (Salla
Allahu wa Allahai wa Sallam, pbuh) maternal uncle, inviting the Chinese
emperor to embrace Islam.
The Muslim mission built
China's first mosque, the magnificent Canton city
mosque known to this day as the 'Memorial Mosque.' Over the years
Muslim trading activity through traders and merchant naval movements led
many to settle in China. One of the first Muslim settlements in
China was established in port city of Cheng Aan during the era of
the Tang dynasty.
The Muslim presence was
resented by the disbelievers. However, their scorn was replaced by respect
when their provocation met with their resounding defeat at the hand of a
small Muslim force in 133 A.H. (751 C.E.) This victory eventually
led to control over the entire Central Asia, and in 138 A.H. (756 C.E.),
Caliph Mansur posted a unit of 4,000 troops to consolidate the
Muslim influence.
These victories opened the
doors of China for the Muslims to spread and propagate the faith. Over the
years, many Muslims settled in China and they married Chinese women. They
established mosques, schools and madrasas. Students from as far as Russia
and India would attend these madrasas. It is reported that in the 1790's,
there was as many as 30,000 Islamic students, and the city of
Bukhara, - the birthplace of Imam Bukhari, one of the
foremost compilers of hadith - which was then part of China, came to be
known as the "Pillar of Islam."
The early Muslims in
China faced oppression, and the tyrannical Manchu dynasty
(1644-191l) was the harshest era. During this period, five wars were waged
against the Muslims: Lanchu (1820-28), Che Kanio (1830), Sinkiang (l847),
Yunan (1857) and Shansi (1861).
The Manchus slaughtered
Muslims and razed mosques. Led by determined leaders like Yaqoob Beg
(l820-77), Muslims liberated the whole of Turkestan and set up an Islamic
state that lasted from 1867 to 1877. The new Turkic-Chinese Muslim power
in Central Asia, comprising of the provinces of Yunan, Szechawan, Shensi
and Kansum, was seen with anxiety by the Russians and the British who had
colonial designs of their own.
The Muslims, inspired by
examples of leaders like Ma Mua-Ming-Hsin, scored many victories.
In Yunan, the Muslims, under Tu Wenhsin, routed the emperor's
troops. He assumed the name of Sultan Sulayman and rallied the Muslims of
Tibet to rise up against the Chinese.
After the Communist
takeover in 1949, Mao Zedung set about dividing the Muslims into
nationalities so they would identify with their 'ethnic' origin and not
their 'Muslim' identity.
According to population
statistics of 1936, the then Kuomingtang Republic of China had an
estimated 48,104,240 Muslims. After the introduction of Mao's policies,
this number was reduced to ten million. No official Chinese
explanation has ever been given for this apparent disappearance of around
38 million Muslims. The mass extermination and destruction of the Muslims
of China pales before the much publicized plight of a handful of Tibetan
monks or the democrats of Tiannaman Square.
Aside from the
physical annihilation, Muslims have been subjected to a constant
attack on their Islamic identity especially during the so-called
Cultural Revolution (1966-76). For instance, posters which appeared
in Peking (later to be called Beijing) in 1966, openly called for the
abolition of Islamic practices. Muslims were also barred from learning
their written language which incorporated the Arabic script and was
influenced by Arabic, Turkish and Farsi. This change was critical as it
distanced Muslims from the Arabic language, the language of the Qur'an and
their Islamic aspirations. During this era many Mosques were closed down
and waqf properties were confiscated.
[The
Ancient Record of the Tang Dynasty describes a landmark visit to China
by Saad ibn Abi Waqqas (ra), one of the companions of Prophet Muhammad
(s) in 650 C.E. This event is considered to be the birth of Islam in
China. The Chinese emperor Yung-Wei respected the teachings of Islam and
considered it to be compatible with the teachings of Confucius. To show
his admiration for Islam, the emperor approved the establishment of
China's first mosque at Ch'ang-an. That mosque still stands today after
fourteen centuries.
Muslims virtually dominated the
import/export business in China during Sung Dynasty (960 - 1279 CE). The
office of Director General of Shipping was consistently held by a Muslim
during this period. During the Ming Dynasty (1368 - 1644 CE), a period
considered to be the golden age of Islam in China, Muslims fully
integrated into Han society by adopting their name and some customs
while retaining their Islamic mode of dress and dietary restrictions.
Anti-Muslim sentiments took root in
China during the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644 - 1911 CE), which was established
by Manchus who were a minority in China. Muslims in China number more
than 35 million, according to unofficial counts. They represent ten
distinct ethnic groups. The largest are the Chinese Hui, who comprise
over half of China's Muslim population. The largest of Turkic groups are
the Uygurs who are most populous in the province of Xinjiang, where they
were once an overwhelming majority.]
Although it may come as
some surprise, Islam has survived in China for over 1300 [1400] years. It
has done so despite such upheavals as the Cultural Revolution as well as
regimes hostile to it.
Even though there are only
sparse records of the event in Arab history, a brief one in Chinese
history, The Ancient Record of the Tang Dynasty describes
a landmark visit to China by an emissary from Arabia in the seventh
century. Saad ibn Abi Waqqas (ra), one of the companions
of Prophet [Muhammad (s)], led the delegation [in 650 C.E.], which brought
gifts as well as the belief system of Islam to China. According to the
traditions of Chinese Muslims, this event is considered to be the birth of
Islam in China.
Although the emperor of
the time, Yung-Wei, found Islam to be a bit too
restrictive for his taste, he respected its teachings and considered it to
be compatible with the teachings of Confucius. For this reason,
he gave Saad complete freedom to propagate the faith among his people. To
show his admiration for Islam, the emperor ordered the establishment of
China's first mosque at Ch'ang-an. The mosque still stands today,
after thirteen [fourteen] centuries.
As time passed, relations
between the Chinese and the Muslim heartland continued to improve. Many
Muslim businessmen, visitors, and traders began to come to China for
commercial and religious reasons. [Arabs had already established trade in
the area before Prophet Muhammad (s).] The Umayyads and Abbasids sent six
delegations to China, all of which were warmly received by the Chinese.
The Muslims who immigrated
to China eventually began to have a great economic impact and influence on
the country. They virtually dominated the import/export business by the
time of the Sung Dynasty (960 - 1279 CE). Indeed, the
office of Director General of Shipping was consistently held by a Muslim
during this period.
In spite of the economic
successes the Muslims enjoyed during these and later times, they were
recognized as being fair, law-abiding, and self-disciplined. Thus, there
is no record of appreciable anti-Muslim sentiment on the part of the
Han (Chinese) people.
By the beginning of the
Ming Dynasty (1368 - 1644 CE) Islam had been nourishing in
China for 700 years. Up to this time, the Muslims had maintained a
separate, alien status which had its own customs, language, and traditions
and was never totally integrated with the Han people. Under the Ming
Dynasty, generally considered to be the golden age of Islam in China,
Muslims gradually became fully integrated into Han society.
An interesting example of
this synthesis by Chinese Muslims was the process by which their
names changed. Many Muslims who married Han women simply took on
the name of the wife. Others took the Chinese surnames of Mo, Mai, and Mu
- names adopted by Muslims who had the names Muhammad, Mustafa, and Masoud.
Still others who could find no Chinese surname similar to their own
adopted the Chinese character that most closely resembled their name - Ha
for Hasan, Hu for Hussein, or Sai for Said, and so on.
In addition to names,
Muslim customs of dress and food also underwent a
synthesis with Chinese culture. The Islamic mode of dress and dietary
restrictions were consistently maintained, however, and not compromised.
In time, the Muslims began to speak Han dialects and to read in Chinese.
Well into the Ming era, the Muslims could not be distinguished from other
Chinese other than by their unique religious customs. For this reason,
once again, there was little friction between Muslim and non-Muslim
Chinese.
The rise of the
Ch'ing Dynasty (1644 - 1911 CE), though, changed this. The Ch'ing
were Manchu (not Han) and were a minority in China. They employed
tactics of divide-and-conquer to keep the Muslims, Han, Tibetans, and
Mongolians in struggles against one another. In particular, they were
responsible for inciting anti-Muslim sentiment throughout China, and used
Han soldiers to suppress the Muslim regions of the country.
When the Manchu
Dynasty fell in 1911, the Republic of China was established by
Sun Yat Sen, who immediately proclaimed that the country
belonged equally to the Han, Hui (Muslim), Man (Manchu),
Meng (Mongol), and the Tsang (Tibetan) peoples. His policies led to some
improvement in relations among these groups.
After Mao Zedong's
revolution in 1948 and the beginning of communist rule in China,
the Muslims, as well as other ethnic minorities found themselves once
again oppressed. They actively struggled against communists before and
after the revolution. In fact, in 1953, the Muslims revolted
twice in an effort to establish an independent Islamic state [in regions
where Muslims were an overwhelming majority]. These revolts were brutally
suppressed by Chinese military force followed by the liberal use of
anti-Muslim propaganda.
Today, the Muslims of
China number some 20 million, according to unofficial counts. The
government census of 1982, however, put the number much lower, at 15
million. These Muslims represent ten distinct ethnic groups.
The largest are the Chinese Hui, who comprise over half of
China's Muslim population and are scattered throughout all of China. There
is also a high concentration of Hui in the province of Ningsha in
the north.
After the Hui,
the remainder of the Muslim population belong to Turkic language
groups and are racially Turks (except for the Mongol Salars
and Aryan Tajiks). The Turkic group is further divided between
the Uygurs, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirgiz, Tatars and Dongshiang.
Nearly all of the Turkic Muslims are found in the western provinces of
Kansu and Xinjiang. The largest of these Muslim groups are the Uygurs.
The Uygurs
are most populous in the province of Xinjiang, where they make up
some 60% of the total population. This relatively small percentage is due
to the massive influx of non-Muslim Chinese into the province in recent
times, a situation that has brought problems of assimilation and raised
concerns about the de-Islamization of one of China's predominantly Muslim
regions. [Muslims in Central Asia, under the USSR, were subjected to a
similar population management,
Russification of Central Asia].
Muslims, and the Uygur
in particular, suffered tremendously under the regime of Mao Zedong
and his "Cultural Revolution." During the communist reign of
terror, there was a violent campaign to eradicate all traces of Islam and
of the ethnic identity of all non-Chinese. The Uygur language,
which had for centuries used Arabic script, was forced to adopt the
Latin alphabet. The Uygurs, as with most believing Muslims, were
subjected to forced labor in the some 30,000 communes set up in
the predominantly Muslim provinces. The imams and akhunds were singled out
for humiliating punishments and tortures....[and were forced to] tend to
pig farms, which were sometimes kept in government-closed mosques.
Under the pretext of
unification of national education, Islamic schools were closed and their
students transferred to other schools which taught only Marxism and
Maoism. Other outrages included the closing of over 29,000 mosques, the
widespread torture of imams, and executions of over 360,000 Muslims.
Since the death of Mao
and the end of his hard-line Marxist outlook nearly fifteen years ago, the
communist government has greatly liberalized its policies toward Islam and
Muslims. And despite the horrors of the Cultural Revolution, Islam has
continued to thrive in China.
Today the campaign for
assimilation started during the Cultural Revolution has slowed
somewhat and the Turkic Muslims have greater freedom to express their
cultural identity. The government has, for instance, allowed the
reinstatement of the Arabic alphabet for use with the Uygur language.
There is, however, continued discrimination against the Turkic Muslims by
the immigrant Chinese (favored by the government) who have settled in the
far western province of Xinjiang. This immigration has posed a problem as
Han Chinese are migrating to Muslim areas at the rate of 200,000 a year.
In many places where Muslims once were a majority, they are now a
minority.
Since religious freedom
was declared in 1978, the Chinese Muslims have not wasted time in
expressing their convictions. There are now some 28,000 mosques in the
entire People's Republic of China, with 12,000 in the province of Xinjiang.
In addition, there is a large number of imams available to lead the Muslim
community (in Xinjiang alone there are over 2,800).
There has been an
increased upsurge in Islamic expression in China, and many nationwide
Islamic associations have been organized to coordinate inter-ethnic
activities among Muslims. Islamic literature can be found quite easily and
there are currently some eight different translations of the Qur'an
in the Chinese language as well as translations in Uygur and the other
Turkic languages. The Muslims of China have also been given almost
unrestricted allowance to make the Hajj to Mecca [Reflections
from the Hajj]. In 1986
there were some 2,300 Chinese Muslims at Hajj. (Compared to the 30 Soviet
Muslims allowed to make the same pilgrimage, this number seems quite
generous, considering that the Soviet Muslim population outnumbers China's
by nearly four times).
China's Muslims have also
been active in the country's internal politics. As always, the Muslims
have refused to be silenced. Several large demonstrations have been staged
by Muslims to protest intrusions on Muslim life. Last year, for instance,
Muslims staged a massive protest rally in Beijing to demand the removal of
anti-Islamic literature from China's bookstores. The Turkic [group]
Muslims have also held demonstrations for a greater voice in the running
of their own affairs and against the continued large-scale immigration
of non-Muslims into their provinces. In the news this spring are more
reports of demonstrations and struggles by Chinese Muslims to regain their
rights. Insha'Allah they will be successful.
http://www.muslimwakeup.com/mainarchive/000385.php?page=1
Tuyuq Mazar Mosque, East Turkestan
By Haroon Moghul
If I were to announce that a Muslim
country, slightly smaller than the size of Iran – but still three times
the size of France – blessed with bountiful oil reserves, a rich culture
and a long attachment to Islam, was suffering brutal torment, one would
justly be disturbed. Perhaps all the more so because one might not know
which country I refer to. That, indeed, is the greatest tragedy of
Chinese-occupied East Turkestan, bounded to the east by China, the south
by Tibet, and the west by Pakistan and the newly-independent Central
Asian states, emerging from Russian domination.
We hear, perhaps day in and day out, of
the treatment accorded indigenous peoples in lands such as Tibet – for a
variety of reasons, including the preponderance of celebrity advocates
and Muslim and Arab sympathies. Inexcusable, though, is the ignorance
over East Turkestan. Because of a century of communist control over
Central Asia, a great blanket of ignorance veils this part of the Ummah
from many Muslims.
Muslim Central Asia: A Background
The Eurasian steppe is a formidable belt
of rolling grassland, almost flat land stretching over five thousand
miles, from Manchuria, China, and ending at the fringes of Hungary,
another nation newly freed from the communist curtain. From these plains
have arisen some of the mightiest warriors of history: the Turkic Huns,
who plagued Rome under Attila; the Scythian Iranians, who dominated
Caucasia; and the Mongol Hordes (from where we get the word “Urdu”), who
nearly overthrew the Islamic world – until they were stopped by the
Muslim rulers of Egypt, the Mamluks, fittingly, also horsemen of the
Eurasian steppe.
However, though the steppe has birthed
Hungarian, Mongol and Iranian (relatives of the Persians in modern-day
Iran) peoples, the dominant group of the last millennium and a half has
been the Turkic one, who emerged by displacing or conquering the native
Iranians – their remnants found today in the only non-Turkic Central
Asian state, Tajikistan – whose language is remarkably close to Persian.
Nevertheless, considering the great spread of Turkic peoples, and common
confusion over their relation to Turks in modern day Turkey, it would do
us well to look a little further at these peoples’ history.
Around 522, the Turks appeared on the
world stage, establishing an empire that stretched from Mongolia (Turks
and Mongols are closely related) to the Black Sea. Out of this empire
grew the many tribes of the Turkic people, some moving into Russia, but
more towards the Muslim southeast. Indeed, what binds the Turkic people
together is not language or culture, but Islam.
To better understand the Turkic role in
the universal Islamic civilization, one must divide them into Western
and Eastern halves. In the West, Seljuk Turks established dominance over
the Middle East around the 10th century. As they pushed into Anatolia,
Turkic farmers and merchants followed behind them, spreading Islam
wherever they went. One of the small states that was founded by these
pioneers was a principality ruled by a khan (leader) named ‘Uthman. The
famous traveler Ibn Battuta met ‘Uthman, noting that he was a
particularly unique leader – and concluding that great things were in
store for ‘Uthman’s children. Little did he know how right he was.
From ‘Uthman’s line rose the Ottoman
Empire: in 1453, the Ottomans took Constantinople, making it their
capital. The current Turkish flag, featuring the crescent and star
design, commemorates this victory: the crescent represents the armies of
Islam, while the star represents Constantinople, which is being
conquered. At its height, the Ottoman Empire stretched from Algeria to
the Caspian Sea, south to Yemen and north to Austria. Their navies
fought the French and British in the Atlantic Ocean, and even helped the
Indonesians resist Portuguese and Dutch forces as far as the East
Indies. The Ottoman dynasty was also the longest-lasting in history, but
its decision to fight against America, Britain and Russia in World War I
led to its collapse in 1924. The last khalifa, an Ottoman, was exiled to
Madina, where he died in the 1940’s.
As for the Eastern Turks: they have had
a similarly splendid history, though much of it remains unfamiliar –
perhaps because they formed many ethnic groups, such as the Kazak,
Uzbek, Uighur (East Turkestani) and Volga Bulgar (Tatar). The idea of
ethnic nationalities, as developed in Europe and the Americas, never
existed in so rigid a form in the Muslim world until colonization.
Thereafter, tolerance and acceptance of diversity were replaced with
totalitarianism, authoritarianism, and a desire for uniformity.
The Eastern Turks
In the 1300’s, the Eastern Turks, as
well as members of the Muslim Mongol Golden Horde, ruled over Moscow and
its environs. In the Volga River valley, the Tatar established a
sultanate called Volga Bulgaria, with its capital at Kazan. At its peak,
Volga Bulgaria was a prosperous, powerful land, famed for Islamic
erudition. In fact, when Muslim Spain fell to invading Christian forces,
many Andalusian scholars and scientists arrived in Volga Bulgaria, where
they were eagerly welcomed. Up until the early 1900’s, Kazan was a major
center for Muslim scholarship and reform.
To the south, a warrior named Uzbek was
the khan of another Turkic tribe. He converted to Islam (his people,
converting en masse after him, named themselves Uzbek in his honor) and
established a powerful dynasty in Central Asia, known for fostering many
Islamic disciplines. Al-Biruni, the great geologist, linguist and
sociologist of India, was from Central Asia; and Ulugh Beg, the highly
regarded astronomer, was also Turkic. Following after Uzbek Khan came
another of this tribe, named Shayban, who established a second dynasty
to the south, in the early 16th century. At one time, the Uzbek (close
relatives of the Uighur) and the Ottomans contemplated building canals
between the Black and Caspian Sea, to connect their empires. This,
however, was never realized.
Divisions in the ranks made the Turkic
Muslim lands a tempting target for a resurgent Russia. In 1552, Volga
Bulgaria was stormed by Russian forces. The Kazak, who only converted to
Islam in the 1700’s, were next. By the 1800’s, all the Muslim steppe
people, excluding the Ottomans (who were never colonized), were under
foreign rule. The situation took a turn for the worse in the 1920’s, as
much of Muslim Central Asia found itself not under a distant Czar in
Moscow, but under the powerful thumb of an aggressive Communist Party,
bent on the destruction of Islam. East Turkestan was at his time under
Chinese rule, separated by the powers of the day from their ethnic and
religious kin, and in 1949, East Turkestan suffered China’s similar
switch to Communism. The Soviet Union quickly collapsed in on itself,
leading to independence for much of Central Asia. The Uighur of East
Turkestan, however, remain under occupation – and are perhaps forgotten
because of this.
The Uighur of East Turkestan
In 751, the Muslims and the Chinese met
on the battlefield for the first time, at Talas River. Local Tibetan and
Uighur tribes, which were at the time Buddhist, allied themselves with
the Muslims – the resulting victory allowed the Uighur peaceful
relations and expansion in eastern Central Asia. In 934, the Uighur
leader, Satuk Boghra Khan, accepted Islam. Many fellow Uighur followed,
though conversion was not forced. The Uighur ruled an independent
kingdom, mixing Muslim and Buddhist populations, that stood until 1759,
when the Manchu Chinese invaded and destroyed it. A fate similar to
Tibet in the south, a Buddhist region with an important Muslim minority
also brought under unfortunate foreign domination.
In 1864, the Uighur revolted against
foreign rule, with some help from the distant Muslim Ottomans. Although
they won, their independence was short-lived. The Chinese returned with
more force in 1884, conquering the land yet again – this time renaming
it “Xinjiang”: the New Dominion, the name by which the region is
commonly referred to today. The Uighur, however, refused to bow. One of
their many revolts succeeded in 1945, leading to the independent
Republic of East Turkestan. At this time, there were few other
independent Muslim nations excepting Afghanistan and Turkey.
But once more, independence did not
last. The people of East Turkestan were invaded in 1949 by a new China,
a communist one. This was to prove a more destructive occupying regime
than any previous, principally because communism has been, since its
inception, uncomfortable with Islam because of its potential for
creating an alternative social system and for inspiring spirited
resistance, as it did with the Central Asian Basmachi fighters who held
out against Russian communism for over a decade.
East Turkestan’s Strategic Importance
Before going on to highlight the gross
human rights violations committed in East Turkestan (again, what China
calls Xinjiang, or alternatively Sinkiang), one must understand why
China is so aggressive in its policies towards the region. Firstly, East
Turkestan is simply enormous; it is 1/6th of the land area of China. As
if this was not enough, the occupied nation borders five
newly-independent Central Asian countries. Should East Turkestan become
independent, it is conceivable that it may, in the long-term, unite
with, or create some form of economic bloc, with its kin countries to
the west. This would form a territory quite nearly the size of China
itself. This is especially dangerous to the strategic interests of not
only China, but Russia and other powers, because each of these Central
Asian nations, including East Turkestan, is blessed (one might say, from
a historically Islamic perspective, cursed) with vast reserves of oil
and gas, a common cultural background and an Islamic faith, however
currently weak. For these reasons, China cannot afford to let go of East
Turkestan. It would mean the end of its energy independence and the
possibility, however distant, of the creation of a check to its
expansion into Asia. In the same manner as Western nations practice
divide and conquer with the Middle East, so too Russia and China with
Islamic Central Asia.
The one thing China does have is a huge
population, in comparison to a sparsely settled East Turkestan. In order
to control East Turkestan’s territory, China has decided to pursue a
two-pronged policy. On the one hand, it will do whatever it can to sap
Uighur strength, weakening their identity and culture. Significantly,
this means an assault on Muslim values. On the other hand, China is
importing huge settler populations, to create “facts on the ground” that
cannot be reversed. By virtue of China’s enormous demographic advantage,
hundreds of thousands of Chinese can annually be entered into the
territory, changing a Muslim region into what will soon be – unless
something stops them – a Chinese one. Then, the region’s oil and
resources will be in “local” hands. Essentially, this is the same policy
Israel has tried to us in the West Bank and Gaza, but Israel has too few
people to successfully attain its goals.
Chinese Human Rights Violations in East Turkestan
In light of September 11th, things have
only become more difficult. America has cooperated with China, in the
“War on Terrorism,” by freezing the assets of Uighur resistance
movements, most of whom have nothing to do with terrorism. Further, with
the world’s attention drawn to Iraq and previously to Afghanistan, China
has been freer to do what it wants without a spotlight, however feeble
its shine. Prior to 9/11, the Uighur were already suffering an
occupation that was perhaps among the worst, if not the worst, in the
Ummah. Now, as difficult as it seems to imagine, things are surely
worse. I have listed below only several of China’s most severe
violations of human rights and dignity, to give the reader a taste of
the darkness blanketing East Turkestan.
• As of 1996, the Chinese government has
detonated forty-four nuclear devices in East Turkestan, using the
country as an experiment in permanent radioactive pollution. In other
words, it is a policy of rendering huge regions of an occupied territory
uninhabitable. The result has been a sickeningly high incidence of
cancer among Uighur; Uighur children also have a disturbing occurrence
of debilitating birth defects.
• As mentioned, China imports ethnic
Chinese settlers to drown out the local population. In 1949, when it
lost its independence, East Turkestan was 93% Muslim; today, it is only
50% Muslim. To ensure their plan succeeds beyond settlement colonialism
(a la Israel), the Chinese government forces a number of Muslim families
to practice abortions.
• As part of their drive to destroy
Uighur culture, the Chinese have attempted to switch Uighur to the Latin
script. However, the Uighur have refused, sticking to their Arabic-based
script, thus making them the only Turkic people still using this
alphabet. As a result of such resistance, Uighur are denied access to
education, such that their illiteracy rate is now a disastrous seventy
percent. Considering the high number of Chinese settlers, competition
for jobs is ever more fierce by the year, and Uighur, who are already
heavily discriminated against and unlikely to get any jobs, have even
less chance with their diminished technical and literary skills.
• Uighur can be jailed for refusing to
eat during daylight hours in Ramadan, part of an orchestrated campaign
to oust from the Uighur their identity and values. This policy was
instituted only a few years ago – and few Muslim countries paid any
attention.
• There has even been an attempt at
creating a Communist Islam: China demands that Uighur mosques display
pictures of Communist leaders, while Imams must speak favorably of
atheist Communism in their sermons!
• However, the Communization of Islam
has certainly failed to some degree, as evinced by China’s attempt to
simply destroy Islam outright: More than 29,000 mosques have been shut
down or destroyed; some are even converted into pig farms.
• Imams are regularly persecuted, often
for no reason other than their attachment to religion. Some are forced
to clean sewers, stables and pig farms.
• Young men are often kidnapped by the
government, never to be seen again. This is especially the case with
young men who show an interest in their religion and/or culture. China
makes the pitiful excuse that these young men are terrorists. In fact,
they are youth who are sick and tired of suffering the indignities of a
brutal occupation and thus are a potential threat to despotism and
dictatorship.
• And finally, as a result of Chinese
occupation, at least 300,000 Uighur have died (out of a population that
today equals only ten million, this is a frighteningly high percentage).
What Can Be Done: Three Proposals
So what is to be done? Below, I have
three proposals, of varying intensity, as suggestions for handling this
conflict in a reasonable and legitimate manner.
Firstly, we need education as an Ummah,
so that we and our future generations are aware of the many branches of
the Muslim Nation, the better to increase awareness and call attention
to injustices. For Islamic schools and mosques, this could mean
organizing teach-ins, lectures, special programs, and so on, to
familiarize ourselves with the Uighur and their plight (please see the
resources at the end of this article).
Secondly, there are more ambitious
options for the many promising Muslims interested in academia and
linguistics. They may want to consider taking courses in this region of
the world, or even specializing in Eurasian studies. In the coming
decades, as the petrochemical wealth of this region becomes more
significant, demand will skyrocket for specialists, thinkers, writers
and the like, much as high demand has been established for the Muslim
Middle East. Options are also available to Muslims with an interest in
languages: One may wish to consider learning Uighur or other Central
Asian languages. Indiana University, with a website link below, has an
excellent summer program for Uighur, with large federal grants and
scholarships also available.
Consider the effect of only a handful of
committed Muslims learning such a language. The Uighur have been, for
quite some time, prevented from learning Arabic. Thus much of their
religion is out of reach. Armed with the knowledge of local languages,
specialists can translate important books and resources; furthermore,
easy-to-access websites could be created, offering essential Islamic
resources and news which would be gradually disseminated. As poor as the
Uighur are, the Chinese cannot stop the benefits of the Internet and
mass media from reaching their controlled state. There should also be
translations of the Qur’an, books on prayer, etiquette, manners and
virtues, etc. Such action on our part would also prevent the influence
of extremist groups, which capitalize on people’s deficient knowledge of
Islam, peddling erroneous and dangerous beliefs (some groups are even
fronts for missionaries; in Albania, after the fall of Communism, some
fringe Christian groups sold Bibles labeled “The Holy Qur’an”).
Thirdly, we can take an overtly
political role. If the goal of Operation Iraqi Freedom was Iraq’s
freedom, then why does East Turkestan not even receive a mention in
speeches and policy direction, let alone the kind of ridiculous
attention lopped onto Iraq in the run-up to the (ultimately
unjustifiable) war? One should never underestimate the power of
political pressure. This also means we must involve the American
community at large, moving outside the boundaries of our religious
groups and organizations, so as to create the largest possible effect.
There is a great potential for alliance with those who trumpet the
similarly just cause of Tibet, a vast groundswell of support for action.
Thus the oppressed are always wronged, and always seeking allies in a
proactive and appropriate fight to change their situation.
For now, however, East Turkestan
struggles almost entirely on its own. It is our responsibility not to
leave them as such. Our efforts, resources and prayers must make an
invisible people visible again.
Haroon Moghul is the author of My
First Police State, available through most major bookseller websites,
such as Barnes and Noble, Borders and Amazon.com. He writes for a
variety of newspapers, Islamic media and journals, and invites your
commentary, criticism and curiosity.
It is extremely difficult to ascertain the
number of Muslims there are in China today. Thus, at this time, any
figure presented should be taken only as a best estimate. Care must be
taken to distinguish clearly between facts on the one hand and
assertions, possibilities, and hypotheses on the other.
In 1980, in the midst of the liberal
mood of the "Four Modernisations" and the post "Gang of Four", post-Mao
period, Beijing announced a new set of figures for the fifty-five ethnic
groups that it currently identifies as "minority nationalities." Among
these fifty-five minorities (whose total population Beijing states to be
55.8 million, or six percent of China's total population), ten are
identified, among which Islam has been the prevailing religion. A
tallying of the figures for these ten groups produces a total population
of slightly more than thirteen million (13,152,200) or about 1.3 percent
of the total Chinese population.
Beijing's general practice has been to
avoid referring to these minority groups as Muslims per se, the
rationale being that many members of the minority in question no longer
"believe in religion". Nevertheless, this figure of about thirteen
million may be taken as Beijing's present official position as to the
total number of Muslims in China (excluding Taiwan province for which
Beijing does not give statistics). Even this increase over the figure
put forth by Beijing in 1953 is still unrealistically small, however, in
view of the nearly one-hundred percent growth of the total Chinese
population during the same period. Also, even if it were true that there
were only ten million Muslims in 1953, it is highly unlikely that their
rate of increase would have failed to keep up with that of the Han
Chinese. Instead it is more likely that the Muslims would have surpassed
the Han given that the minorities have not been obliged to conform to
the rigid population control measures that the Chinese leadership has
imposed upon the Han.
|
Muslim Minorities in
the People's Republic of China |
|
MINORITY |
LOCATION |
LANGUAGE FAMILY |
1953
CENSUS |
1957
PEOPLE'S HANDBOOK |
1961
NATIONALITIE IN CHINA |
BEIJING REVIEW 1980 |
APPROX. AVG ANNUAL % GROWTH |
| Hui |
All
Provinces but especially Ningxia, Gansu, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Henan,
Hebei |
Sino
Tibetan |
3,559,350 |
3,550,000 |
3,934,335 |
6,490,000 |
2.3% |
|
Uighur |
Xinjiang |
Altaic
(Turkic) |
3,640,125 |
3,640,000 |
3,901,205 |
5,480,000 |
1.6% |
|
Kazak |
Xinjiang, Gansu, Qinghai |
Altaic
(Turkic) |
475,000 |
500,000 |
533,160 |
800,000 |
1.8% |
|
Dongxiang |
Gansu |
Altaic
(Mongolian) |
|
150,000 |
159,345 |
190,000 |
0.8% |
|
Kyrgyz |
Xinjiang |
Altaic
(Turkic) |
60,000 |
70,000 |
68,862 |
97,000 |
1% |
|
Salar |
Qinghai, Gansu |
Altaic
(Turkic) |
|
30,000 |
31,923 |
56,000 |
2% |
|
Tajik |
Xinjiang |
Indo
Iranian |
80,000 |
14,000 |
15,014 |
22,000 |
1.4% |
|
Uzbek |
Xinjiang |
Altaic
(Turkic) |
13,000 |
13,000 |
11,557 |
7,500 |
2.4% |
|
Bonan |
Gansu |
Altaic
(Mongolian) |
|
4,000 |
5,516 |
6,800 |
1.6% |
|
Tatar |
Xinjiang |
Altaic
(Turkic) |
|
6,000 |
4,370 |
2,900 |
4.3% |
|
Totals |
|
|
7,827,475 |
7,977,000 |
8,665,287 |
13,152,200 |
|
| Beijing
Review Vol 23 #9 (March 3 1980), quoting figures based on 1978
statistics |
Government attempts to
favor the minorities have included the establishment of "autonomous"
minority adminstrative units at three levels: the region (comparable to
a province and of which five have been designated), the prefecture (zhou),
and the county (xian). The Muslim-inhabited areas that have been
designated as autonomous regions, prefectures, and counties are shown in
the following table.
Muslim Inhabited Areas
Designated as Autonomous Regions, Districts, and Counties. |
|
MINORITY |
PROVINCE |
AUTONOMOUS AREAS |
YEAR
FOUNDED |
|
Hui |
Ningxia |
Ningxia
Hui Autonomous Region |
1958 |
| Gansu |
Linxia
Hui Autonomous Prefecture
Zhangjiaquan Hui Autonomous County |
1956
1955 |
|
Xinjiang |
Changji
Hui Autonomous Coutny
Yenqi Hui Autonomous County |
1954
1954 |
| Guizhou |
Weining
Yi-Hui-Miao Autonomous County |
1954 |
| Hebei |
Dachang
Hui Autonomous County
Mengcum Hui Autonomous County |
1954
1954 |
|
Liaoning |
Fouxian
Hui Autonomous County |
1957 |
| Qinghai |
Hualong
Hui Autonomous County
Menyuan Hui Autonomous County |
1954
1953 |
| Yunan |
Weishan
Yi-Hui Autonomous County |
1960 |
|
Uighur |
Xinjiang |
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region |
1955 |
|
Kazak |
Xinjiang |
Ili
Kazak Autonomous Prefecture
Barkol Kazak Autonomous County
Mulei Kazak Autonomous County |
1954
1954
1954 |
| Gansu |
Aksai
Kazak Autonomous Region |
1954 |
| Qinghai |
Haixa
Mongol-Tibetan-Kazak Autonomous Prefecture |
1954 |
|
Dongxiang |
Gansu |
Dongxiang Autonomous Region |
1950 |
|
Kyrgyz |
Xinjiang |
Kizilsu
Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture |
1954 |
|
Salar |
Qinghai |
Xunhua
Salar Autonomous Region |
1954 |
|
Tajik |
Xinjiang |
Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous Region |
1954 |
|
Uzbek |
Xinjiang |
None |
|
|
Bonan |
Gansu,
Qinghai |
None |
|
|
Tatar |
Xinjiang |
None |
|
To a great extent these territories are
autonomous in name only. While the minority after which they are named
does have considerable representation in local government and party
organs, the Han generally retain ultimate control and pursue various
colonising strategies designed to sinify the minorities and establish a
strong Han presence. In no case is the "autonomous" unit inhabited only
by the minority (or minorities) for which it is named and in some cases
Han are in fact the majority. (This is even true, for example, of the
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region whose population is approximately only
one-third Hui but two-thirds Han.)
As noted above, ten minorities have now
been officially identified for which Islam has been the dominant
religious tradition. As also noted, not all members of the ten
minorities actually practice Islam. But Islam is so much a part of each
of the ten ethnic identities that individual members of each group who,
for one reason or another, do not practice Islam are still considered
Muslim "by birth" or "by blood"; in nearly all cases, if members of any
of these ten minorities do not practice Islam, then they do not practice
any religion.
Each of China's ten Muslim minorities
traces its descent to ancestors who were absorbed into China by Chinese
territorial expansion or who migrated to China either for commercial
purposes, as refugees from conflicts outside China, or to assist the
Chinese court. Islam was not carried to China "by the sword" and, with
minor exceptions, Muslims did not engage in proselytisation in China.
Nine of the ten Muslim minorities are of
Central Asian derivation; they are the Uighur, Kazak, Dongxiang, Kyrgyz,
Salar, Tajik, Uzbek, Bonan, and Tatar. Six of these nine live in what
has traditionally been known as Eastern (or Chinese) Turkestan,
territory that became a province of China (Xinjiang) only in 1884 but
which constitutes one sixth of China's total land area; until only very
recently these six Muslim groups made up well over ninety percent of
Xinjiang's population.
Each of the nine Central Asian Muslim
minorities still speaks its own native languages, all of which belong to
the Altaic language family and are thus as different from Chinese as is
English. Of the nine minorities, six (the Uighur, Kazak, Kyrgyz, Salar,
Uzbek, and Tatar) speak Turkic languages which are similar to that
spoken in Turkey and to those used throughout much of the former Soviet
Union. Traditionally, when written, Arabic script was used for these
peoples' languages although over the years both the former Soviet and
Chinese governments have launched numerous campaigns to replace Arabic
with other scripts. Four of the Turkic-speaking Muslim minorities
represented in China - the Kazak, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Tatar - have, in
fact, greater numbers of their members living in the former Soviet Union
than in China and the first three of them also extend into Afghanistan.
Two of China's six Turkic-speaking minorities (the Kazak and Kyrgyz),
still maintain a pastoral nomadic herding mode of subsistence while four
of the six (the Uighur, Uzbek, Tatar, and Salar), have long been
sedentarised and are either agriculturists or urban oasis dwellers. Also
in Xinjiang, and farthest away from China proper, are the
Persian-speaking Tajik, a minority whose greatest numbers live across
the border in Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union.
The two remaining Muslim groups of
Central Asian origin are the Dongxiang and Bonan (also spelled
Tunghsiang and Paoan respectively) of Gansu province, both of whom speak
their own separate Mongolian language. Unlike other Mongols, who are
pastoral herders, both the Dongxiang and Bonan have adopted sedentary
agricultural patterns characteristic of the Han-influenced areas in
which they live. The Dongxiang, like the Turkic Salar who also live in a
more Han-influenced area than Xinjiang, have a long-standing reputation
among Han for daring, fiercencess, and solidarity and played active
parts in the Muslim rebellions that occurred up through the early
twentieth century.
By an analysis of the mosque
congregations in China we arrive at a higher total for the Chinese
Muslim population. On the mainland of China according to the China
Islamic Association there are 40,000 mosques. Traditionally a mosque is
built by Muslim localities on demand, under the supervision of local
Muslims. Conservatively speaking a mosque cannot be built and maintained
by less than 500 Muslims in one locality; if we multiply the total
number of mosques by 500 persons per mosque we arrive at a total of
20,000,000 Muslims in China in 1955, when this number of mosques are
said to have existed. Yet we cannot use the 500 person per mosque as a
mean average because in Peking, there are 42 mosques among a population
of 80,000 Muslims which averages 2,000 Muslims under the jurisdiction of
each mosque. This estimate of mosque do not even include the mosque used
primarily by women who in many communities have their own mosques due to
Islamic traditions. Taking these estimates into consideration the total
Muslim population in China should not be less than 40 million.
The Communists, on
assuming power, followed a very cautious policy towards the Muslims.
Islam was not a discredited religion, unlike Christianity, which was
closely associated with Western imperialism. At the same time Islam was
not an officially 'dead' religion like Chinese Buddhism or Taoism, to be
praised for its contributions to popular revolts of the past and now
relegated to the museum shelf. Rather Islam was a living, 'foreign'
religion in the heart of China.
Furthermore the Communist government was
anxious to establish good relations with the Muslim governments of the
Middle East, South Asia and Africa. The Communists took careful notice
of their Muslim minority from their first days of power. The Agrarian
Reform Law of the People's Republic of China, promulgated on June 30th
1950, specifically protects the rights of Muslims to mosque land, but
also states that Ahungs (and other religious leaders) should be
given land to work, unless they have other means of making a living.
Communist troops destined for Muslim areas were given specific
instructions to respect mosques, refrain from eating pork, and to show
respect to Muslim women. Special hospitals serving halal food
were established in Beijing and Tianjin. In May 1953 the Chinese Islamic
Association was formed, and a Chinese Islamic Seminary was constructed
in Beijing. For the first time a translation of the Qu'ran was prepared
in the vernacular speech, so that it might be available to the masses of
Hui people who spoke no Arabic and could not understand classical
Chinese. This translation, by Muhammad Ma Chien, stressed the
compatibility between Islam and Marxism. The Chinese Association for the
Promotion of the Hui People's Culture was also set up in these early
years. Muslim delegations were permitted to go on The Haj (a
pilgrimage to Mecca) starting in 1952, but were prevented from entering
the Hedjaz by the Saudi Arabian Government.
China's two major Muslim nationalities
were given autonomous government in their own national regions, the
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, and the Ningxia Hui Autonomous
Region. Cultural diversity is recognised and even promoted, but the
position of the autonomous regions in China resembles that of the Soviet
Central Asian Republics, and secession from the People's Republic
remains unthinkable. Relations between the Hui and the Central
government have not always run smoothly. Periods of discord occurred
during land reform in the early 1950's, and also during the
anti-rightist campaigns of 1958. Many Muslim religious leaders were
criticised, and the Chinese Association for the Promotion of the Hui
People's Culture was closed down. There have even been cases of armed
risings by Muslims, but these have remained small-scale local affairs,
and bear no resemblance to the great rebellions which swept the
Northwest under the Qing and the Republic. One continued cause of Han-Hui
friction has been the massive emigration of non-Muslims from Central
China to the Northwest. Communist policy towards Muslim religious
freedom is tolerant of individual rights of worship, but frowns on
prosyletisation. The important consideration for the Communists is that
the Muslim's loyalty to Peking should not be in question. Thus: 'Like
all religious people in New China, the Moslems love their free
motherland ardently. Only when they have done their best to safeguard
their country can they have their own beliefs and practice their
religion without discrimination'.
The position of Islam during the Cutural
Revolution remains unclear. Information from China during these years
was limited to short reports of Muslims celebrating Corban and Bairam.
It seems certain that Chinese Muslims did suffer from Red Guard excesses
during this period, with an association being formed under the name of
'The Revolutionary Struggle Group for the Abolition of Islam'. The study
of Arabic was attacked as being anti-Chinese, and even circumcision was
criticised. It is improbable that the Central government initiated these
excesses, and they seem to have ceased with the running-down of the Red
Guard movement. The Muslims survived the Cultural Revolution better than
any other religious group, and at all times some mosques remained open.
Since the Cultural Revolution little information has been forthcoming,
but it is fair to assume that the position of Chinese Muslims has again
improved.
Despite the restricted environment in
which Chinese Islam now functions, the government of Deng Xiaoping is
more tolerant toward Islam than any in two decades. Institutions
concerned with religion in general and Islam in particular were revived
as well. In April 1980, the China Islamic Association held its first
meeting in 17 years. The more liberal policies of this post-Mao
leadership have, however, engendered a good deal of resentment from many
quarters. Several areas have reported with obvious distaste the
re-emergence of "feudal superstitious practices" associated with
religion and, despite massive government efforts to discredit Lin Biao
and the Gang of Four's repression of religion, there must be many
Chinese who believe that Lin and the Gang were right to do so.
Thus, it is highly unlikely that a
change in regime would result in greater freedom of religion. The odds
are that any new government would be less, rather than more, tolerant.
Any sharp changes away from tolerance of Islam would be tempered by
China's need to maintain friendly relations with the Middle East. A
Muslim rebellion could also pay into the hands of the former Soviet
Union, as had happened in Xinjiang in 1962. Still, as the PRC's
behaviour during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution shows,
pragmatic policies may under certain circumstances be abandoned in
favour of more ideologically pure policies.
![[HUI Muslim]](images/hui.jpg)
In Chinese, Hui are known as Huihui, Huihui minzu ("Huihui
people" or "Huihui nationality") and Huizu (a contraction of
Huihui minzu). Traditionally they have also called themselves
Huijiaoren ("Hui-religion - Islam - people"), Mumin (from the
Arabic mu'min) and Jiaomen (a term meaning something like "people
of the Teaching"). Today the Chinese government promotes the use of "Musilin"
(Muslim") to denote Hui (and others) who actively believe in Islam as
distinct from Hui in general, a portion of whom no longer practice the
religion. In other countries Hui are called by such names as Panthay and
Dungan. In English the Hui have often been referred to simply as Chinese
Muslims, a term that has caused much confusion because it also rightly
includes the other nine Muslim ethnic groups in China.
To outsiders they are virtually
indistinguishable from Han Chinese, although many Han will say they can
spot a Hui and Hui say they can recognise each other. Unlike the Turkic
communities, the Hui are not concentrated in one part of the country but
are spread throughout the whole of the PRC with substantial communities
in the major cities. Although they are so numerous and accessible, they
have been the subject of considerable controversy and it is still not
possible to say with any degree of certainty precisely how many Hui
there are in China. It is generally agreed that they are by far the most
numerous of Muslim groups in China, and official statistics in 1990 gave
the figure of 8.6 million for the total population of Hui. There has
been much dispute over whether the Hui are simply Han Chinese who adhere
to the Islamic faith. This article concentrates on the Hui communities
and examines their origins and what makes them distinctive in China
today.
 |
Ethnic Origin:
Islam was introduced to China during the flourishing Tang dynasty
(A.D. 618-906). Arab and Persian merchants and mariners sailed to and
settled in Canton and other southeastern Chinese port cities, bringing
the religion just after it was founded. Muslim soldiers, brought
across Central Asia to help China's emperor quell a rebellion in A.D.
757, introduced Islam to the interior. Many of these Arabs, Persians
and Central Asians, nearly all men, married local Han Chinese women
and remained in China, speaking Persian and Arabic as their lingua
francas. They lived in special districts (called "barbarian
settlements"), where they were held responsible for maintaining law
and order according to the customs of their homelands. The Muslims
increased in numbers as the children of mixed Muslim and Han marriage
were raised as Muslims and as foreign Muslims continued to settle in
China for several more countries. Another major Muslim influx came
with the Mongols, who conquered China in the thirteenth century and
imported thousands of Central and West Asian artisans, scholars and
administrators to help them rule China. Muslims directed the financial
administration of the empire and were appointed to other high
positions in the central and provincial governments.
While the Muslims remained a
distinctly foreign minority during their first seven centuries in
China, during the next five centuries they had relatively little
contact with the rest of the Muslim world. When the Han Chinese
overthrew the Mongols in 1368, they sought to wipe out the
much-resented foreign influence and thus prohibited the use of foreign
languages, foreign names and foreign clothing and restricted foreign
travel. European capture of the Asian sea trade from the Arabs also
contributed to halting Muslim migration to China. It was during this
period that the Muslims in China became sinicized, acculturating to
Han Chinese ways through the adoption of Han surnames, clothing and
food habits and through speaking Chinese as their everyday language.
The continued in-marriage of Han women, as well as the adoption of Han
children and occasional conversion of Han adults, further contributed
to the increase in the number of Muslims and, at the same time, to
their becoming increasingly similar, physically as well as culturally,
to the Han. Muslims ceased being referred to as Arabs, barbarians and
foreigners and came to be known instead by a new name, Huihui.
The next phase of Muslim history in
China was one of violent ethnic conflict between the Han and the Hui.
From the sixteenth to early twentith century, Muslims of northwest
China (Hui, Salars and others) and Hui in Yunnan in southwest China
rose against both local Han and the government in series of rebellions
said to have claimed as many as 10 million lives. Exacerbating the
ethnic conflict were intense factional cleavages within the Muslim
communities themselves, notably that between the so-called New
Teaching adherents inspired by Naqshbandi fundamentalism and ideas of
reform and Old Teaching adherents who clung to established practices
of Chinese Islam.
With the founding of the Republic of
China in 1912, the Hui were formally recognised as one of China's
"five great peoples" (usually translated "races" in English), part of
the new Western-inspired government's attempt to win over the
independent-minded minorities who dominated more than half of China's
territory. Many Hui, following trends among the Han, became actively
engaged in reform movements. During the civil war between the Chinese
Communists and Nationalists, both sides actively sought to win Hui
loyalties. After the Communist victory and establishment of the PRC in
1949, several thousand Hui fled with the Nationalists to Taiwan, while
the majority remained on the mainland. There the Communist leaders
developed a Soviet-inspired minority policy that formally identified
major ethnic groups as "minority nationalities" (shaoshu minzu) and
promised them rights of autonomy and self-government in exchange for
their support. The Communist party has recognised 55 ethnic groups as
minority nationalities and established 107 so-called autonomous
governments at three levels - 5 at the provincial level, 30 at a
middle (prefectural) level and 72 at the county level. Twelve of these
bear the name "Hui."
|
|
| Language:
An intriguing and still under-researched area of Hui life is the
language of the community. Some scholars speak of a Huihui hua, a
"Muslim vernacular" of Islamic terms which distinguishes the Hui from
their Han neighbours. According to the official history of Hunan's Hui
community, the original languages of the Hui as they moved east were
Arabic, Persian and Chinese used together, but Chinese became the
lingua franca as Muslim and Chinese communities intermingled.
However, even today, Hui people in Hunan use certain Arabic and
Persian words in their daily contact with other Hui. On meeting they
will use the Arabic and universal Muslim greeting of seliamu
(salaam 'aleikum) and Muslim are addressed as duosity from the Persian
word for friend 'dust'. Arabic or Persian words are used for 'halal'
and 'haram' (pure and unclean), for ritual baths and for words
needed in dealing with the deceased. Chinese characters representing
the Arabic names for feast days and seliamu can be seen on banners at
these times in cities such as Xian.
Interest in Arabic, the language of
the Qu'ran and the lingua franca of Islam worldwide has
increased steadily in China's Muslim communities. After the programme
of reforms was introduced in 1978, contact between China and the
Islamic world, which had been important in the 1950s but had decreased
during the Cultural Revolution, was again promoted and this provided
further stimulus for the study of Arabic. Although the Hui people have
used Chinese as their main means of communication for centuries,
classical Qu'ranic Arabic is used in the mosques, although for many
worshippers it is probably just intoned rather than understood. In the
Great Mosque in Xian, bilingual Arabic and Chinese stone tablets bear
witness to the use of the language there over the centuries and Imans
today can be seen reading journals in Arabic. Arabic has also
developed in Hainan in supplementary schools in the mosques.
|
|
| Culture, Society, and Customs:
In the past, the "Ahong" (or Iman) picks Huihui names for
newborns, presides over weddings and funerals. Every aspect of life is
influenced by the Islam religion, especially in the diet and food. The
Hui are prohibited to eat pork and they don't eat animal blood or
animal which are not properly slaughtered. These were the religious
laws handled down by the Qu'ran, and have gradually become the custom
of the Hui through the ages. The trade and industry run by Hui are
usually connected to their unique customs, presently many parts of
China have state-owned and privately-owned Hui restaurants and the Hui
food stores.
Among the Hui in Ningxia as well as
those in some parts of Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, there are quite a
few farmers. Most Hui, however, have been city dwellers for
generations. They are mostly shopkeepers and artisans and,
increasingly since the 1950s, factory workers and civil servants.
Before the advent of higher hygienic standards, Hui butchers in the
cities had earned the reputation of selling the best and creanest
meat.
The diet requirements of the Hui are
explicitly derived from the doctrines of Hanafism. In cuisine, the Hui,
incorporating the culinary methods of the Han, created the famous
"Muslim Dishes" which are favoured by other nationalities in China as
well as Muslims from other parts of the world. On the occasion of
traditional activities and solemn rallies, men of the Hui nationality
customarily wear round-topped and brimless caps made of white or black
cotton cloth or wool fabric. The women wear black, white or green
kerchiefs made of silk or cotton cloth. Three major festivals of
Islam, namely Lesser Bairam (breaking the fast), Corban
(sacrificial festival) and Molid Nabawi (birthday of the
Prophet Muhammad), have over years, been the traditional festivals of
the Hui. On festival days, each family usually fries oil cakes and
other deep-fried dough food for celebrations and for entertaining
visting relatives. On the festival of Corban, a sacrificial ceremony
is held solemnly as part of the celebrations.
The Hui men's formal wear is the long
gown and it is topped with a white cloth skullcap. The women's
costumes are different in diffrent locations. The Hui women in Hainan
Island's Ya county wear clothing which distinguishes them from the
local Han, Li, and Miao women. They like to wear blue or green gown
which is long to the knee with trimmed cuffs, and the sides often have
an inch-wide fringe, which is mainly black in color. Everyone hangs
over their head a black apron which is fastened to the waist. The
Northwest Hui women often wear a cape-like turban, and it is green for
unmarried girls, black for those married but who are not yet a
grandmother, and those who have attained granmother status wear white
colour turbans. The other costumes are not dissimilar to that of the
Han and other ethnic groups. |
In the northwest corner of China lies a
province of deserts and mountains. Its remote capital city is more
land-locked than any other city in the world. A province of majestic
history, its people once ruled all of Central Asia. Marco Polo himself
traded along the famous route that cuts through its southern edge - the
Silk Road. And it's the homeland of the unreached Muslim groups in
China.
The motherland of the Turkic people is
Turkestan. The name "Turkestan" is Iranian in origin. The term, which
means "The land of the Turkic people", dates back to seventh century.
The western part of Turkestan was gradually conquered by Tsarist Russian
in 1965, after which it became known as Western Turkestan. After the
formation of the USSR in 1922, Western Turkestan was divided into five
republics: Uzbekistan, Kazakhistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and
Tajikstan. The eastern part was invaded by the Manchu rulers of China in
1876. Subsequently, Turkestan was called Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous
Region.
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Location:
Xinjiang is divided into a northern and a southern section by the
Tianshan mountain range which passes through it. The southern section
is the Tarim Basin and the northern is the Dzungarian Basin. The Tarim
Basin is a large basin enclosed on the three sides by high mountains
and inclined toward the northeast. To the south is the Kulun range, to
the west and north the Pamirs, the "roof of the world," and the
Tianshan range; and to the southeast is the slightly lower Altin Tagh
range. In the centre is the Takla Makan desert, formed from a
continental lake during geologic time by a drying of the climate and
an uplifting of the ground. The streams and rivers formed by melting
ice in the enclosing mountain ranges provide water for the oases which
are distributed along the northern and southern edges of the basin.
They are: the Hami, Turfan, Karashahr, Kucha, Aksu and Kashgar on the
north along the Tianshan range; and the Yarkand, Khotan, and Charkhlik
to the south along the Kulun range.
In the Tarim Basin of Xinjiang, south
of the Tianshan mountains, more than 2,000 years of recorded history
can be divided, on the basis of the area's habitation by the Uighur
(ancient names Huihe or Huihu) and other Turkic peoples into a
pre-Turkic period (from about the second century BC until the eighth
or ninth century AD); and a Turkic period (from the eighth or ninth
century AD on). The time between the eighth or ninth century and the
tenth or eleventh century was the period during which the immigrant
Turkic peoples gradually fused with the original inhabitants. Because
the Turkic peoples were in a position of superiority both politically
and numerically, the Turkic language gradually overcame the languages
of the original inhabitants in both the northern and southern sections
of the Tarim Basin. By the fifteenth or sixteenth century, because the
entire Tarim Basin had been politically, economically, culturally,
religiously and linguistically unified, a new national community, the
Uighur nationality, had taken shape.
In this vast province, where Han
Chinese are a minority, antagonistic nationalities, mountains and
deserts limit Beijing's political power, Xinjiang's economic
development has lagged behind east China, fuelling calls for
independence from Xinjiang's disgruntled nationalities. Beijing has
seen that Xinjiang must prosper if it is to remain a secure and
integral part of China. Xinjiang was formerly of value mainly for
military security, testing nuclear weapons and agriculture. Beijing
has now opened the border to cross-border trade. Several cities,
notably Kashgar and Urumqi, have recently been allowed the trade and
investment privileges already accorded to China's coastal areas.
Already there is a flourishing trade
across the border in Chinese light industrial manufactured goods,
which are in short supply in Central Asia as they are in the whole of
the former Soviet Union. These products come from as far as afield as
Shanghai and Guangzhou. The main trade route is from Urumqi to Alma
Ata, a journey of six hundred miles, crossing the 4,000 metre high
Tianshan mountains. The rail link, unfinished for forty years, has
recently been completed.
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| Distribution of the Muslim
Minorities:
The latest census gives the present population of Xinjiang as sightly
over 15 million. Of these, Uighur number more than 7 million, the
Kazak 1 million, the Kyrgyz 150,000, Uzbek 15,000, the Tatar 5,000,
Tajik 30,000, the ethnic Manchu 90,000, Hui (Chinese Muslims) 600,000,
with the remainder of the population being Han Chinese.
Unheralded socio-political
incorporation of Xinjiang into the Chinese nation-state has taken
place in the last forty years. While Xinjiang has been under Chinese
political domination since the defeat of the Zungar in 1754, until the
middle of 20th century it was but loosely integrated into China
proper. The extent of the incorporation of the Xinjiang region into
China is indicated by Han migration, communication, education, and
occupational shifts since the 1940s.
Han migration into Xinjiang has
swelled their local population to an incredible twenty-six times that
of the 1940 level, with an annual growth of 8.1 per cent. The increase
of the Han population has been accompanied by the growth and
delineation of other Muslim groups in addition to the Uighur.
Accompanying the remarkable rise of the Han population, a dramatic
increase in the Hui population can also be seen, perhaps leading to
recent tensions in Hui-Uighur relations. While Hui population growth
in Xinjiang between 1940 and 1982 has increased over six times
(averaging an annual growth of 4.5 per cent), the Uighur population
has followed a more natural biological growth of 1.7 per cent. The
dramatic rise of Han migration and increasing competition for scarce
resources has been the impetus for several Uighur uprising in recent
years.
Chinese incorporation of Xinjiang has
led to a further development of ethnic socio-economic niches. Whereas
earlier travellers reported little distinction in labour and education
among Muslims other than that between settled and nomadic, the 1982
census has revealed vast differences in socio-economic structure.
It is noteworthy that 84 per cent of
the Uighur are involved in the production of agriculture and animal
husbandry, the same as the average for all ethnic groups. The Hui,
however, have only 60.7 per cent involved in farming and husbandry,
with trade and commerce taking up many more of their numbers. The
Uighur rank far below the Uzbek and Tatar in the scientific and
technical occupations, primarily due to the larger proportion of the
urbanised intellectuals among the Uzbek and Tatar. This is also
reflected in reports on education among Muslim minorities in China.
The Uighur are about average in terms
of university graduates and illiteracy in China as compared with other
ethnic groups (0.2 and 45 per cent, respectively). The Tatar achieve
the highest representation of university graduates among Muslims (39
per cent), far below the average of all China (32 per cent). The main
drawback of these figures is that they reflect only what is regarded
by the state as education, namely, training in Chinese language and
the sciences. Although elementary and often secondary education is
provided in Uighur, Mandarin has become the language of upward
mobility in Xinjiang, as well as the rest of China.
In conclusion it can be said that the
steady flow of Chinese settlers, sinization of the Turkic language,
mixed marriages and coercive birth control among the Turkic Muslims
pose the biggest threats to the survival of Turkic Muslims of Xinjiang.
The ever growing Chinese population has brought hunger and
unemployment to the Turkic Muslims. Economic exploitation and the
policy of assimilation are the main sources of turmoil in Xinjiang.
Fundamental individual human rights and freedoms of the Turkic Muslims
of Xinjiang including civil, political, economic, cultural, social and
religious rights, continue to be violated by the Chinese Communists.
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| Xinjiang After Mao:
There was a measure of liberalisation affecting the Turkic Muslims of
Xinjiang after the death of Mao Zedong. Nevertheless, many armed
clashes, disputes and street demonstrations were reported in the
cities of Xinjiang during this period.
Thousands of Turkic Muslim students
who demonstrated in the cities of Urumqi, Beijing and Shanghai in
December 1985 demanded self rule, democratic elections of Turkic
Muslim to replace Chinese officials assigned by Beijing, economic self
determination, increased opportunities for Turkic Muslim education at
home and abroad, an end to the practices of sending convicted Chinese
criminals to Xinjiang, and an end to nuclear testing in this Turkic
Muslim country. The Chinese leaders rejected the student demands.
Those who led the demonstrations were later arrested and taken away
from the Urumqi University campus.
Again, in June 1988, hundreds of
Turkic Muslim students demonstrated in Urumchi protesting plans to
make them share dormitories with Chinese students. They also protested
coersive birth control rules to be imposed on the Turkic Muslims of
Xinjiang as of July 1st, 1988. In December 1988, hundreds of Uighur
students staged a protest march in Beijing against the showing of two
films of historical fiction that Uighur students found disrespectful
to their race.
The book "Sex Habits" published by
Shanghai Cultural House, seriously besmirched Islam, harmed the
religious feeling of the Muslims, and aroused strong resentment in
China as a whole. In May 1989, tens of thousands of Muslims in China
staged protest marches in Beijing, Xian, Lanzhou, Ningxia, Qinghai and
in the cities of Xinjiang. Thousands of Turkic Muslims who staged a
protest march in Urumchi, the capital of Xinjiang, attacked and
stormed the organs of the Regional Party Committee, the Advisory
Committee, and the Discipline Inspection Committee, creating a grave
disturbance rarely seen after the Chinese Communist takeover of
Xinjiang.
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